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1 This edited book is a promising attempt to provide guidance for assessing the place of the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) within Turkish political
system. The exponential rise of the Islam-friendly AKP in Turkey since the elections of
November 2002 has added fuel to the intense debates about the place of political Islam in
global  affairs.  Turkey  is  known  for  its  Kemalist  establishment  whose  allegiance  to
secularism is often greater than to democratic values. Accordingly, the Constitution bans
the questioning of  secularism by any political  group.  Kramer (2000,  7-8)  argues  that
without the spread of secular values based on the ideas of human individuality and self-
determination,  a  top-down imposition of  secularism on society  has  not  been able  to
guarantee  individual  freedoms  and  democracy;  instead,  it  has  alienated  practicing
Turkish Muslims by excluding not only political but also social expressions of Islam. It is
often said that the AKP has successfully mobilized the alienated societal segments that
protest the rigid policies of the state vis-à-vis social expressions of Islam, in particular the
headscarf  ban  and  the  discrimination  of  graduates  of  religious  schools  (Imam  Hatip
Okulları).  
2 Although the AKP was founded by former leading members of the Islamist movement led
by Necmettin Erbakan, its discourse is significantly different.  The AKP de-emphasizes
Islam in  order  to  embrace  democracy,  human  rights  and  rule  of  law,  values  which
originated  in  the  West  but  are  increasingly  perceived  as  universal.  The  AKP’s
responsiveness to the contemporary global order has been interpreted as the essential
source of its success (Rumford 2008). Presented as a pro-European Union (EU) reformist
movement within Turkish Islamism, the AKP has even been proposed as an antidote to
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the rise of religious fundamentalism and as a role model for the Islamic world (Fuller
2008).  However,  since  2005  the  EU reform process  has  slowed down in  Turkey.  The
secularists’ suspicions toward the AKP’s reformist discourse and policies have reached
such a level that the Turkish Constitutional Court recently found certain party members
guilty  of  violating  the  fundamental  principles  of  secular  Republic.  Although Turkish
Islamists are united in their negative reaction to the decision of the Constitutional Court,
their internal conflicts about the future of Turkish society and Turkey’s EU membership
have become more pronounced (Ergül 2007).
3 As regards religiosity in contemporary Turkish society, it is observed that although the
majority of the Turkish population is Sunni Muslim, Islamic fundamentalism is negligible
compared to other Muslim states, as is public support for Islamist terrorism (Pew Global
Attitudes Project 2006). According to the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
(Türkiye  Ekonomik  ve  Sosyal  Etüdler  Vakfı,  TESEV)  surveys,  only  21  percent  of  the
respondents reported endorsing sharia in 1999 and this marginal support decreased to 9
percent in 2006 (TESEV 2006). Rose and Özcan (2007) argue that the controversies over
political  Islam  in  Turkey  do  not  revolve  around  the  supremacy  of  civil  law  or  the
legitimacy of violence in the name of religion, but around the public visibility of Islam as
seen in issues such as the headscarf ban. 
4 According to the First European Quality of Life Survey in Turkey (Rose and Özcan 2007),
nearly two-fifths of the respondents reported attending religious services at least weekly,
while  the other two-fifths  never or  hardly ever  attend mosques.  As  regards wearing
religious  symbols,  TESEV (2006)  finds  that  in 2006,  approximately three out  of  eight
Turkish women reported that they did not wear any head covering. Only 12 percent of
Turkish women said they wear the traditional Islamic headscarf, and only 1 percent of
Turkish women cover themselves entirely in public with a full-length chador (Kalaycıoğlu
2005). 
5 However, the picture is not bright with respect to individual freedoms. Recent research
led by Binnaz Toprak (2008) demonstrates that the secular segments of the Anatolian
public feel threatened by the alliance between conservatism and religiosity. Both non-
practicing Muslims and Alevites feel obliged to follow Sunni practices such as fasting
during Ramadan. The intolerance towards youth is alarming. The report concluded that
the activities of AKP municipalities have reinforced the conservative segments of Turkish
society and increased societal pressure based on Muslim mores. The reaction of AKP-
friendly media was to accuse Toprak of politicizing research. In addition, some Islamist
thinkers tried to justify societal pressures on non-practicing Muslims in religious terms,
arguing that one is responsible for making one’s neighbours eligible for paradise. Finally,
public  opinion in  Turkey  generally  favours  the  Army as  the  most  trustworthy  state
institution and does not see the its ‘guarantorship’ as incompatible with secularism.
6 Against this complex picture, Çizre’s volume offers four chapters, devoted respectively to
the historical evolution of the AKP, the secular veto players against AKP reformism, the
role of the EU in both legitimating and demotivating the AKP, and the social bases of the
AKP movement. Part one, which is much longer than the remaining chapters, is devoted
to locating the AKP movement within political Islam in Turkey, and is the book’s most
significant contribution. 
7 In their illuminating article, Çınar and Duran explain that Turkish Islamism is unique for
at least six reasons. First, unlike other Islamic states in the world, the religious scholars,
or ulema, are weak in Turkey. In Ottoman times, this was due to a complex bureaucratic
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structure that  divided ulema powers among different  bureaucracies.  In contemporary
Turkey,  there are substantial  limitations to ulema practices.  For instance,  considering
Islam  in  political  activities  and  law-making  is  constitutionally  banned.  Second,  the
Islamist  intelligentsia  in Turkey is  predominantly  influenced by a  Sufi  tradition that
rejects radicalism and anti-state violence. Third, Turkish Islam is local and nationalist in
the sense that it does not resonate well with internationalist Islamist movements. Fourth,
as it  did  not  arise  out  of  a  previous  colonization  experience,  it  does  not  embrace
anticolonialist discourses  that  reinforce a negative image of  the West.  Fifth,  there is
significant diversity among Turkish Islamists;  the National Outlook, Nurcu, and Gülen
movements are just a few examples. Sixth, it is moderate and diffuse because significant
segments of its elite and other followers have been secularized through education. The
harsh political  competition among rightist  parties  also  plays  a  role  in  fracturing  its
ideological coherence. In sum, Turkish Islamists generally participate in Turkish politics
and attempt to distance themselves from fundamentalist violence, and do not reject the
idea of the state. 
8 In this framework, both Çınar and Duran (Chapter 1) and Yıldız (Chapter 2) support the
argument  that  there  have  been  two  major  tendencies  within  contemporary  Turkish
political Islam. The first is represented by the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş,
MG) led by Erbakan. The MG has faced accusations that it intends to impose the sharia a
top-down  transformation  ofon  Turkey  into  sharia,  similar  to  the  Islamic  revolution
witnessed in Iran in 1979.  These accusations  led to the so-called “28th of  February”
process in 1997, when Erbakan’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and Virtue Party (Fazilet
Partisi), were banned. The current political party of the MG is the Felicity Party (Saadet
Partisi), which is largely marginalized within Turkish public opinion. The MG is known as
anti-Western.  It  accuses  modernism  and  the  West  of  being  the  sources  of  poverty,
degeneration, and social illnesses in the Islamic world.
9 The second major type of contemporary Turkish Islamism is the reformist movement led
by  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan,  leader  of  the  AKP.  Contrary  to  the  MG,  AKP  reformists
frequently refer to originally Western values such as human rights,  civil  society,  and
democracy. They claim to reconcile Islamic civilization both with modernity and with
Western  ways  of  living,  including  capitalism.  The  AKP  has  announced  that  it  is
‘conservative democratic’ rather than Islamist and that it embraces secularism. Unlike
the MG, the AKP also gives explicit support to Turkey’s EU membership candidacy. It has
enacted  significant  reform  packages  which  expanded  cultural  rights,  including
broadcasting and education in Kurdish, and has tried to revise the established state policy
on Cyprus question. However, the AKP makes it clear that its understanding of secularism
is different from that of the Kemalist establishment in that it entails greater freedoms for
Muslims. There is still a need to provide a fuller analysis of AKP policies, in particular in
the areas of economic and foreign policy.
10 Çayır’s paper is a welcome contribution to the analysis of the two different philosophies
within Turkish Islamism. Studying not only the political discourse but also the literary
works of Turkish Islamists, Çayır concludes that the ‘collective Islamism’ that sought to
expand an anti-Western interpretation of Islam in 1970s and 1980s has been replaced by a
‘self-critical Islamism’ that encourages Islamic actors to embrace modern lives and see
themselves as pious ‘individuals’ rather than committed ‘soldiers’ of Islamic community. 
11 Çınar criticizes the depiction of the AKP as a consistent and liberal Islamic movement. He
emphasizes the inconsistencies within the discourse and policies of the AKP government
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and  claims  that  the  AKP  government  lacks  a  practical  democratization  agenda
independent from the EU membership requirements. In other words, the AKP has used
the EU project as a means to ease secularist restrictions on public expression of Islamic
belief.  For instance,  it  has instrumentalized EU conditionality in order to restrict the
political  authority  of  the  military,  which claims to  be  the  guardian of  secularism in
Turkey. On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights’s decisions to legitimize
the headscarf ban in Turkey and the EU’s greater sensitivity to the religious liberties of
Alevites  and  non-Muslim minorities  has  led  the  AKP  to  distance  itself  from the  EU
membership ideal. The AKP’s initially liberal discourse is thus susceptible to becoming
statist-nationalist, in particular regarding the Kurdish issue. Çınar argues that both the
new anti-terror law, which is found stricter than the previous legislation in dealing with
separatism, and the AKP leadership’s uneasy reaction to public criticism, including their
explicit  hostility  against  journalists  critical  of  government  policies,  violate  liberal
democratic principles. Moreover, the systematic recruitment of AKP-friendly practicing
Muslims into state bureaucracies and the emergence of a private sector falling under the
AKP orbit paves the way for further fragmentation and polarization of Turkish society. It
is to be noted that Çınar also accuses the secular establishment of reinforcing the already
existing divisions within Turkish society and of violating liberal democratic principles. 
12 Cizre  concentrates  on  the  relationship  between  the  Turkish  army  and  the  AKP
government  in  order  to  discuss  whether  the  army has  been  an  important  factor  in
slowing down the AKP reforms. The Turkish army embraced the role of the ‘guardian’ of
the Republican principles, including secularism, and has explicitly specified two internal
enemies:  Kurdish separatism and religious  reactionaryism (irtica).  Following the 1960
coup,  the army-dominated National  Security Council  (Milli  Güvenlik  Kurulu,  MGK) was
established as an advisory body to the government. In line with European democratic
standards for the control of civilians over the military, the AKP government enacted
several reforms to curtail the military’s supremacy over Turkish politics and to civilianize
the NSC.  According to Cizre,  the Turkish army is  still  too significant  within Turkish
political system and undermines the AKP government’s self-confidence in continuing the
EU reform process.  The  General  Staff’s  electronic  memorandum warning against  the
election of an Islamist President on 27 April 2007 is offered as an example demonstrating
the  army’s  intimidating  activities  against  the  AKP  government.  However,  recent
developments seem to run against Cizre’s assumptions. One of the AKP’s leading members
became the president of the Republic in 2007, and the rivalry between the army and the
AKP government seems to be toned down, especially after the outbreak of the Ergenekon
case, which accuses among others top members of the military elite of attempting a coup.
13 Usul investigates the relationship between the AKP government and the EU and argues
that the AKP initially expected the EU process to lead to a substantial  advance with
regard to individual freedoms. The author calls this phase ‘euro-enthusiasm.’ However,
‘euro-enthusiasm’  was  eventually  replaced  by  ‘euro-fatigue’  due  to  an  increasing
opposition to Turkey’s membership from among Europeans and the EU’s emphasis on the
enhancement of the status of Kurdish people, non-Muslim minorities and Alevites instead
of pious Muslims’ rights. It would be useful to the reader if the author elaborates the
concepts used in the paper, in particular euro-skepticism, euro-enthusiasm, and euro-
fatigue in the context of Turkey-EU relations. 
14 Finally,  Dalmış  and Aydın discuss  the voter  profile  and the social  bases  for  the AKP
electorate, and provide interesting results. They claim that the social bases of the AKP
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derive not only from the MG but also from another rightist party, the Motherland Party (
Anavatan Partisi) founded by Turgut Özal in 1983. They also claim that the voter profile of
the AKP is best described as “religious, rightist,  and conservative.” Their findings are
compatible  with  the  existant  literature,  in  particular  with  Çarkoğlu  and  Kalaycıoğlu
(2007) who suggest that AKP voters rather than religiosity by itself, the voters of the JDP
are distinguished more by their critical stance on religious freedoms than by religiosity
itself.  Indeed, the majority of AKP voters complain about state-led restrictions on the
headscarf  and on imam hatip graduates,  as  well  as  about the general  political  inertia
(Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 216-220). 
15 Overall,  the  book  as  a  whole  is  well-edited,  and  manages  to  maintain  a  consistent
approach across its eight papers. However, in line with the promising title of the book, it
would be useful to provide background information about the normative bases and the
historical  evolution of  Turkish secularism for  the  readers  that  are  not  familiar  with
Turkish politics. In particular, depicting the Turkish secular elite as a unified front that
resists democratization and Europeanization is misleading.
16 Turkish secularism is parallel to French ‘laicism’ in that the secularization process has
been used to consolidate both the national identity and the authority of the secular elite
against monarchist and authoritarian religious establishments (Kramer 2000, Sheikh and
Wæver 2005). However, Turkey’s practises of secularism have been more exclusionary
toward  religion  than  France  due  to  political  systemic  reasons.  In  France  secularism
coexisted  with  multi-party  democracy  whereas  in  Turkey  secularization was  initially
promoted as a top-down process (Kuru 2007). Toprak (1981: 47) argues that Turkey is only
a ‘semi-secular’ state because it embraced state supervision of religious organization and
activity, a stance which is not compatible with the traditional Western understanding of
secularism. Religion and religious institutions were generally represented as obstacles to
innovation  and  national  progress.  Thus,  rationalism  rather  than  religion  has  been
embraced  as  the  basis  of  law,  education  and  politics.  Article  24  of  the  Turkish
Constitution highlights that individuals not only possess the right ofreligious freedom,
but also a right to be free from religion (Rose and Özcan 2007). The Turkish Constitutional
Court states that religious freedoms can be restricted in order to defend democracy,
equality and liberty, which secularism guarantees by protecting the individual “not only
against arbitrary interference by the State but also from external pressure by extremist
movements” (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey no. 44774/98).
17 Moreover, secularism touches directly on the rights of women. Against Muslim norms
that segregate men and women in the mosque and stipulate that women should not work
with strangers, the founders of the secular Turkish Republic stressed gender equality and
Turkish women gained the right to vote before women in France and Switzerland (Rose
and  Özcan  2007). Finally,  the  book  should  have  explained  that  the  Turkish  army’s
relationship with Islam has not always been antagonistic. After the military coup in 1980,
the army introduced the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (Türk-islam Sentezi), through which it
aimed  to  prevent  the  spread  of  Communism  by  ‘Sunnifying’  Alevites  as  well  as
‘Turkifying’ Kurdish citizens through compulsory religious education and a pro-active
Presidency of Religion Affairs (Diyanet), thereby paving the way for further Islamization
of Turkish society (Karakas 2007). In sum, Turkey’s secularism is a highly controversial
issue  and  should  be  discussed further.  Overall,  this  book  provides  an  insightful
introduction to the contemporary AKP movement within Turkish political  Islam, and
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therefore  it  is  recommendable  to  students  of  comparative  politics,  democracy  and
religion, as well as scholars of Turkish politics. 
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